Abstract. We study stochastic games with incomplete information on one side, in which the transition is controlled by one of the players.
Introduction.
In a seminal work, Aumann and Maschler [1, 2] introduced infinitely repeated two-player zero-sum games with incomplete information on one side. Those are repeated games where the payoff matrix is known to one player, say player 1, but is not known to the other player-all player 2 knows is that the payoff matrix was drawn according to some known probability distribution from a finite set of possible matrices. Aumann and Maschler proved that those games have a value.
The issue faced by player 1 is the optimal use of information. On the one hand, player 1 needs to reveal his information (at least partially) in order to make use of it. On the other hand, any piece of information that is revealed to player 2 can later be exploited against player 1.
In the optimal strategies devised by Aumann and Maschler, player 1 reveals part of his information at the first stage, but no further information is revealed during the game. Player 2, on the other hand, has to play optimally whatever the actual payoff matrix may be. Aumann and Maschler achieved this by using Blackwell's approachability strategies.
When the underlying game is a stochastic game rather than a repeated one, the difficulties the players face are more serious.
Is it optimal for player 1 to reveal information only once in every state, or will he reveal information several times in each state? In repeated games, it does not help to dilute the revelation of information over time, since player 2 would wait until player 1 has revealed all the information he will ever reveal, and since interim payoffs are irrelevant in the long run. In stochastic games, by contrast, the game can move to a different state that can be more or less favorable to the informed player. By giving away some information about the true game at the initial stage, player 1 might induce player 2 to adapt in an adverse way, while postponing this disclosure might allow player 1 to escape from specific states. This is a crude explanation for why it may help player 1 to conceal his information for a while.
For player 2 the issue is to devise the analog of Blackwell's approachability strategies for stochastic games.
Sorin [20, 21] and Sorin and Zamir [23] studied classes of stochastic games with incomplete information on one side that have a single nonabsorbing state, and proved that these games have a min-max value, a max-min value, and that the values of the n-stage (resp., λ-discounted) games converge as n goes to infinity (resp., as λ goes to 0) to the max-min value. Rosenberg and Vieille [17] studied recursive games with incomplete information on one side, and proved that the max-min value exists and is equal to the limit of the values of n-stage games (resp., λ-discounted games) as n goes to infinity (resp., as λ goes to 0).
In the present paper we study stochastic games in which one player controls the transitions; that is, the evolution of the stochastic state depends on the actions of one player but is independent of the actions of his opponent.
We show that if player 1 (who is the informed player) controls the transitions, then the game admits a value. We also propose a specific optimal strategy for player 1 and explain the way this strategy uses the additional information he possesses. Roughly speaking, the state space is partitioned into disjoint sets, which are called communicating sets. Whenever the play enters a communicating set, player 1 chooses a stationary nonrevealing strategy, and he plays this strategy until a new communicating set is visited. The random choice of the stationary strategy itself may be revealing, in that the distribution used at stage n to select a stationary strategy depends on the actual payoff function.
If player 2 controls the transitions, then the game admits a min-max value and a max-min value. We use an example to show that the two values may differ.
The techniques and the characterizations we provide extend the ideas of Aumann and Maschler for incomplete information games to our framework.
In the last section of the paper we extend the existence results to the case of stochastic games with a single controller and incomplete information on both sides; that is, to the case when each of the players has some partial private information about the true stochastic game being played.
We parametrize the game by the initial distribution p and by the initial state ω, and denote it by Γ(p, ω). We write Γ for (Γ(p, ω)) (p,ω)∈∆(K)×Ω .
A few remarks are in order. This model is an extension of the classical model of zero-sum stochastic games. It is also an extension of Aumann and Maschler's model of repeated games with incomplete information, where a zero-sum matrix game is first drawn using p, then played repeatedly over time. Here, nature chooses a stochastic game that is then played over time.
We assume without loss of generality (w.l.o.g.) that 0 ≤ g k ≤ 1 for every k ∈ K, and we identify each k ∈ K with the probability measure over K that gives weight 1 to k.
Strategies and values.
Players may base their choices on the stochastic states the play has visited so far, as well as on past choices of actions (of the two players). Player 1 can base his choices also on the state of the world k.
The space of histories of length n is H n = (Ω × I × J) n−1 × Ω, the space of finite histories is H = ∪ n∈N H n , and the space of plays (infinite histories) is
∞ . H n defines naturally a finite algebra H n over H ∞ . We equip H ∞ with the σ-algebra ∨ n∈N H n spanned by all cylinder sets. A (behavioral) strategy of player 1 is a function σ : K × H → ∆(I). A strategy for player 2 is a function τ :
A strategy σ is stationary if the mixed action played at every stage depends only on the current state. We identify each vector x = (x ω ) ω∈Ω ∈ (∆(I)) Ω with the stationary strategy that plays the mixed action x ω whenever the game visits ω. Stationary strategies of player 2 are defined analogously.
Every distribution p, every initial stochastic state ω, and every pair of strategies (σ, τ ) induce a probability measure P p,ω,σ,τ over K × H ∞ (equipped with the product σ-algebra). We denote by E p,ω,σ,τ the corresponding expectation operator.
We let k, ω n , i n and j n denote, respectively, the actual game being played, the current state at stage n, and the actions played at stage n. These are random variables.
Define the expected average payoff up to stage N by
where
We recall the definitions of the max-min value, the min-max value, and the (uniform) value. Definition 1. Player 1 can guarantee φ ∈ R in the game Γ(p, ω) if, for every > 0, there exists a strategy σ of player 1 and N ∈ N such that
We then say that the strategy σ guarantees φ − in Γ(p, ω).
Note that, due to the Lipshitz property on payoffs and the compactness of ∆(K), the integer N in Definition 1 can be chosen to be independent of (p, ω). The definition of a function that is guaranteed by player 2 is similar, with the roles of the two players exchanged.
Definition 2. Player 2 can defend φ ∈ R in the game Γ(p, ω) if, for every > 0 and every strategy σ of player 1, there exists a strategy τ of player 2 and N ∈ N such that
We say that such a strategy τ defends φ + against σ in Γ(p, ω).
The definition of a function that is defended by player 1 is similar, with the roles of the two players exchanged. The following lemma follows from the definitions.
Lemma 3. Player 1 can guarantee (resp., defend) max{φ, φ } as soon as he can guarantee (resp., defend) both φ and φ . Player 2 can guarantee (resp., defend) min{φ, φ } as soon as he can guarantee (resp., defend) both φ and φ . The value (resp., max-min value, min-max value) is denoted by v (resp., v,v) when it exists. Observe that v ≤v whenever the two exist. Note that each of the functions v andv is 1-Lipshitz in p as soon as it exists. When the value v exists, any strategy that guarantees v up to ε is ε-optimal. Strategies that are ε-optimal for each ε > 0 are also termed optimal.
Related literature.
Most of the literature deals with the polar cases where either Ω or K is a singleton. In the former case, the game is a repeated game with incomplete information. Such games have a value; see Aumann and Maschler [2] . Moreover, an explicit formula for the value exists. Letting u * (p) be the value of the matrix game with payoff function k p k g k (·, ·), the value of the repeated game with incomplete information is the concavification cav u * of u * (see section 3.1 for definitions).
When K is a singleton the game is a standard stochastic game. Such games have a value; see Mertens and Neyman [9] .
For general stochastic games with incomplete information, little is known, but some classes were studied in the literature. For "Big Match" games Sorin [20, 21] and Sorin and Zamir [23] proved the existence of the max-min value and of the min-max value. These values may differ.
For recursive games, Rosenberg and Vieille [17] proved that the max-min value exists and provided an example where the value does not exist.
Parthasarathy and Raghavan [14] were the first to study the class of stochastic games in which one player controls the transitions. They proved that in this class the value exists, and both players have optimal stationary strategies. They also studied the two-player non-zero-sum game. Filar [5] studied the situation in which states are partitioned into two subsets, and each player controls the transitions from states in his subset of the partition. Several finite-stage algorithms that calculate the value and optimal stationary strategies were proposed in the literature (see the survey by Raghavan and Filar [15] and the references therein).
Recently Renault [16] studied games where transitions do not depend on the actions chosen by the players and only player 1 observes the current state of the world. All that player 2 observes are the actions of player 1. We provide an example of a game where player 2 controls the transitions and v = v. We also provide a characterization ofv and v as a unique solution to a functional equation, and we study the structure of simple optimal strategies of player 1.
Statements
We prove no result on the existence of the limit of the values of the finitely repeated games. In the games analyzed so far (see section 2.3), this limit is known to exist and coincides with v. This property is conjectured to hold in general by Mertens [8] . 
Concavification.
Given a continuous function u : ∆(K) → R, we denote by cav u its concavification, namely, the least concave function v defined over ∆(K), such that v ≥ u. It is the function whose hypograph is the convex hull of the hypograph of u. Similarly, we denote by vex u its convexification, namely, the largest convex function v such that v ≤ u. Both cav u and vex u are well defined. Thus, cav and vex are functional operators that act on real-valued functions defined on ∆(K).
Lemma 8 (see, e.g., Laraki [7] ). When ∆(K) is endowed with the L 1 -norm, the two operators cav and vex map C-Lipshitz functions into C-Lipshitz functions.
Lemma 9. When the set of functions u : ∆(K) → R is endowed with the L ∞ -norm, the two operators cav and vex are nonexpansive.
Proof. For any two real-valued continuous functions over ∆(K), u, and v, one has
where u * (x) = inf{ y, x − u(y), y ∈ R K } is the conjugate of u. Since u * * = cav u, the result follows.
The argument for the operator vex is analogous. 
To prove the opposite inequality, we first observe that if B is convex, closed, and upwards comprehensive, one has
Set g = cav max i∈I f Ai , and
Since g ≥ f Ai for each i ∈ I, and using (3) with
Approachability.
We present here the basic approachability result of Blackwell [4] , in the framework of stochastic games. Let G be a stochastic game with payoffs in R K . The description of such a game is the same as that of a two-player zero-sum stochastic game given in section 2.1, except that the reward function g now takes values in R K . The definition of strategies in this framework is similar to that given in section 2.2.
, the average vector payoff in the first N stages.
Definition 12. A vector a ∈ R
K is approachable by player 2 at ω if, for every ε > 0, there is a strategy τ of player 2 and N ∈ N such that
We say that such a strategy τ approaches a + ε at ω. In other words, for every ε player 2 has a strategy such that the average payoff vector will eventually not exceed a + ε. Note that a is approachable if and only if a + ε is approachable for every ε > 0, so that the set of approachable vectors is closed and upwards comprehensive.
Our definition differs slightly from that of Blackwell [4] , where the strategy τ is required to be independent of ε (i.e., the original definition of Blackwell reads as ∃τ, ∀ε > 0, etc.). Any vector a that is approachable in Blackwell's sense is also approachable in our sense. The two definitions are not equivalent. However, it is easily checked that, if a is approachable (in our sense) at each state, it is also approachable in Blackwell's sense.
Every stochastic game with incomplete information Γ(p, ω) induces a stochastic game with vector payoffs Γ V (ω), in which the payoff coordinates are given by the reward functions of the component games (G k ) of Γ(p, ω). The next lemma relates the two games. Its proof is straightforward.
We now state Blackwell's sufficient condition for approachability in this context. Denote by u ∞ (p, ω) the uniform value of the two-player zero-sum stochastic game with reward function k∈K p k g k (ω, ·, ·). The existence of u ∞ follows, by Mertens and Neyman [9] or by Parthasarathy and Raghavan [14] . We also denote by u n (p, ω) the value of the n-stage version of that game (thus, lim n→∞ u n = u ∞ , and the limit is uniform in p).
In this statement (and in later ones), cav u ∞ is the concavification of u ∞ with respect to the first variable, p:
Sketch of the proof. Let ε > 0, and choose N such that
We define an auxiliary game with vector payoffs, where each stage corresponds to N stages in the original game. We apply Blackwell's result to the auxiliary game, noting that Blackwell's proof still holds when the stage game changes from stage to stage, with payoffs remaining bounded.
A more precise result was proved by Milman [13, Theorem 2.1.1]. For results with similar flavor, see Shimkin and Shwartz [19] .
Information revelation.
Let σ be a given strategy of player 1. For n ∈ N, we denote by p n the conditional distribution over K given H n : it is the belief held by player 2 about the true game being played. 3 The difference p n − p n+1 1 may be interpreted as the amount of information that is revealed at stage n.
It is well known (see, e.g., Sorin [22, Lemma 3.4] or Mertens, Sorin, and Zamir
Given p ∈ ∆(K), we denote by σ p the average nonrevealing strategy defined by
) for each finite history h. It is convenient to relate the benefit derived by player 1 from using his information at a given stage to the amount of information revealed at that stage. Let n ∈ N be given. The expected payoff at stage n, conditional on past play, is
where σ(k, h n ) and τ (h n ) are the mixed moves used by the two players at that stage. By Proposition 3.2 and Lemma 3.13 in Sorin [22] ,
Definition 15. Let T be a set of strategies of player 2. Let ε > 0 and σ be given. The strategy τ ∈ T is ε-exhausting information given (p, ω) and
This notion is relative to the class T . Which class of strategies is meant will always be clear from the context.
Lemma 16. Let T , ε, σ, (p, ω) as in Definition 15. Let τ ∈ T be an ε-exhausting strategy given (p, ω) and σ, and let
N ∈ N be such that E p,ω,σ, τ [ ∞ n=N p n − p n+1 2 2 ] ≤ ε
. Then for each strategy τ ∈ T that coincides with τ until stage N , one has
Proof. By Jensen's inequality and since (p n ) is a martingale, for every l ≥ N one has
The equality in (6) is a standard result for martingales; see, e.g., Karatzas and Shreve [6, p. 32] . The second inequality follows. The first inequality follows using Jensen's inequality (applied to each stage independently) and since
The next lemma is specific to stochastic games with incomplete information. In effect, it proves that the amount of information revealed by player 1 up to stage l ∈ N is an upper bound on the excess gain from the private information.
Lemma 17. Let (σ, τ ) be given. For every p ∈ ∆(K), every ω ∈ Ω, and every l ∈ N, one has
Proof. To distinguish between E p,ω,σ,τ and E p,ω,σ p ,τ , we denote the latter by E p,ω,σ p ,τ . Let n ≤ l be given. Since σ p is nonrevealing, and by the Lipshitz property,
By (5), it follows that
On the other hand, it is easily checked that the probabilities P n p,ω,σ,τ and P n p,ω,σ p ,τ induced by P and
By (8) and (9),
which implies the result.
A partition of states.
In this section we define a partition of the set of states that will be extensively used in what follows. It hinges on the fact that a single player controls the transitions, but it does not matter who is the controller. The partition is similar to the one defined by Ross and Varadarajan [18] for Markov decision processes, who also provide an algorithm to calculate it.
We assume that player 1 controls the transitions. The partition when player 2 controls the transitions is defined analogously. Since transitions are independent of player 2's actions, we here omit player 2's strategy from the notations.
Given ω ∈ Ω, we denote by r ω = min {n ∈ N, ω n = ω} the stage of the first visit to ω. By convention, the minimum over an empty set is +∞.
Note that the relation leads to is reflexive and transitive. We define an equivalence relation over Ω by ω ↔ ω if and only if ω leads to ω and ω leads to ω.
The equivalence classes of this relation are called communicating sets. Given ω ∈ Ω, we let C ω denote the communicating set that contains ω, and we define Thus, a state is null if it is visited only finitely many times, whatever player 1 plays: I ω = ∅ if and only if ω is transient for every stationary strategy x.
Proof. We start with the direct implication.
and let x be any stationary strategy that coincides with x ω in each state ω ∈ C ω . It is easy to show that C ω is recurrent under x. The reverse implication is straightforward. Some communicating sets are absorbing, in the sense that once entered, the play remains there forever. We now single them out. Let x * be a fully mixed stationary strategy, i.e., x * ω [i] > 0 for every ω ∈ Ω and every i ∈ I. If R ⊆ Ω is a recurrent set for x * , then R is a communicating set, and I ω = I for every ω ∈ R.
We denote by Ω 0 the union of these sets:
The following lemma implies that the max-min value and the min-max value are constant over C ω for every ω ∈ Ω 0 , provided they exist.
Lemma 20. Assume player 1 controls transitions. Let ω ∈ Ω and ω ∈ C ω . If one of the players can guarantee φ in Γ(p, ω), he can also guarantee φ in Γ(p, ω ).
Proof. Assume first that player 1 can guarantee φ in Γ(p, ω). Let σ be a strategy that guarantees φ − ε in Γ(p, ω), and let σ * be the strategy that plays x Cω until r ω , then switches to σ. In the game Γ(p, ω ), the strategy σ * guarantees φ − ε for each ε > ε.
Assume now that player 2 can guarantee φ in Γ(p, ω), but assume to the contrary that he cannot guarantee φ in Γ(p, ω ) for some ω ∈ C ω . We argue that player 2 cannot guarantee φ in Γ(p, ω), a contradiction. Since player 2 cannot guarantee φ in Γ(p, ω ), there is ε > 0 such that for every strategy τ of player 2 and every N ∈ N there is a strategy σ τ,N of player 1 and an integer n τ,N ≥ N such that γ n τ,N (p, ω , σ τ,N , τ) > φ + ε. Let τ and N be given. Let σ * be the strategy of player 1 defined as follows. Play x Cω until stage r ω , then switch to σ τν ,M , where τ ν is the strategy induced by τ after stage ν, and M is sufficiently large so that
When player 2 controls the transitions, we denote by J ω the set of stay actions at ω: 3.5. Auxiliary games. As for the analysis of zero-sum repeated games with incomplete information on one side, it is convenient to introduce an average game in which no player is informed of the realization of k.
For notational ease, assume that player 1 is the controller. For every p ∈ ∆(K) and every nonnull state ω ∈ Ω, we denote by Γ R (p, ω) the zero-sum stochastic game with (i) initial state ω, (ii) state space C ω , (iii) reward function k p k g k , (iv) action sets I ω and J at each state ω ∈ C ω , and (v) transition function induced by q.
In the case where player 2 is the controller, the game Γ R (p, ω) is defined by restricting player 2's action set to J ω in each state ω ∈ C ω .
Thus, Γ R (p, ω) is the stochastic game in which player 1 is not informed of the realization of k (or does not use his information), and the controller is restricted to stay actions. In particular, the game remains in C ω forever. The letter R is a symbol for restricted, while the symbol stands for average.
Note that Γ R (p, ω) is a single controller game, so that both players have optimal stationary strategies. Denote by u(p, ω) its value. Note that
By convention, if ω is a null state, we set u(p, ω) = −∞ if player 1 controls the transitions, and u(p, ω) = +∞ if player 2 controls the transitions. By Lemma 20, for every communicating set C, u(p, ω) is independent of ω ∈ C.
Proposition 21. For every ω ∈ Ω 0 and every
Thus, restricted to Ω 0 , the game is similar to a standard repeated game with incomplete information.
Proof. The proof of this lemma is similar to the proof for repeated games with incomplete information on one side. Let p ∈ ∆(K) and ω ∈ Ω 0 be given. Clearly player 1, by not using his information, can guarantee u(p, ω). By Lemma 10, player 1 can guarantee cav u(p, ω).
The proof that player 2 can guarantee cav u is based on approachability results, and closely follows classical lines. Let a ∈ R K be such that We here define three operators on B that will be used to characterize the solutions of the game.
When transitions are controlled by player 1, we define the operator T 1 by
By convention, a maximum over an empty set is −∞. In this expression, E [φ | ω , i] stands for the expectation of φ under q (· | ω , i) .
When transitions are controlled by player 2, we define the operators T 2 and T 3 by
Since the maximum (or minimum) of a finite number of elements of B belongs to B, and since by Lemma 8 concavification preserves Lipshitz properties when ∆(K) is endowed with the L 1 -norm, all three operators T 1 , T 2 , and T 3 map B into B. Note that for each i = 1, 2, 3 the operator T i is monotonic:
Moreover, for every φ ∈ B, T i φ is constant over C ω , for each ω ∈ Ω. We now assume that player 1 controls transitions, and prove a few results on T 1 . When transitions are controlled by player 2, identical results hold for both T 2 and T 3 . Since the proofs are similar, they are omitted.
Proposition 23. 
φ coincides with cav
Since T 1 φ and T 2 φ are concave for every φ ∈ B, the fixed points of those operators are concave functions. Since 0 is concave, and since T 3 maps concave functions to concave functions, the analog of Proposition 23 for T 3 implies that the fixed point of T 3 is concave as well.
Proof. By monotonicity of T 1 , item 2 follows from item 1. Since cav u(p, ω) is constant on every communicating set, so is T 1 φ(p, ω) for every φ ∈ B. Since I ω = I for every ω ∈ Ω 0 , T 1 φ(p, ω) = cav u(p, ω) for every φ ∈ B, every ω ∈ Ω 0 , and every p ∈ ∆(K). Thus, item 3 will follow from item 1. We now prove item 1. By Ascoli's characterization, B is a compact metric space when endowed with the L ∞ -norm. By Lemma 9, T 1 is nonexpansive, so that it is continuous on B. Hence T 1 has a fixed point.
We prove uniqueness by contradiction. Let φ 1 and φ 2 be two distinct fixed points of T 1 , and assume w.l.o.g.
contain those states where the difference is maximal. Since both φ 1 (p, ·) and φ 2 (p, ·) are constant on each communicating set, C ω ⊆ D whenever ω ∈ D.
Since
Let ω ∈ D be given, and let p 0 ∈ ∆(K) be an extreme point of the convex hull of the set {p ∈ ∆(K) :
Since φ 1 (·, ω) and φ 2 (·, ω) are concave, it also follows that (p 0 , φ 1 (p 0 , ω)) is an extreme point of the hypograph of the concave function φ 1 (·, ω). This implies
, and therefore
By the definition of D, this implies that q(D
Thus, for every ω ∈ D there exists ω ∈ C ω and i ∈ I ω that satisfy q(D | ω , i) = 1. This implies the existence of ω 1 , ω 2 ∈ D such that C ω1 = C ω2 and ω 1 ↔ ω 2 , a contradiction. This proves 1.
To prove 4, we assume that δ = max (p,ω)∈∆(K)×Ω (f (p, ω) − φ(p, ω)) > 0, and repeat the second part of the proof of 1 to obtain a contradiction.
Incomplete information on one side.

Preliminaries.
We here single out a useful lemma. The lemma concerns a standard two-player zero-sum stochastic game G and its version G R in which player 1 is restricted to stay actions. Thus, K is a singleton.
Lemma 24. Let G be a two-player zero-sum stochastic game with transitions controlled by player 1, and let ω ∈ Ω. If player 2 can guarantee that α ∈ R in G R (ω)
and he can guarantee that φ : Ω → R in G, then he can also guarantee max{α, max ω ∈Cω,i /
∈I ω
E[φ|ω , i]} in G(ω).
Proof. By Lemma 20 player 2 can guarantee α in G R (ω ) for every ω ∈ C ω . Let τ 1 be a strategy that guarantees α + ε in G R (ω ) for every ω ∈ C ω , and let τ 2 be a strategy that guarantees φ + ε in G. Let N ∈ N be such that for every n ≥ N , every ω ∈ C ω , and every σ in G R (ω), γ n (ω , σ, τ 1 ) ≤ α + ε, and for every σ in G, γ n (ω , σ, τ 2 ) ≤ φ(ω ) + ε.
Define ν = 1 + inf {n ≥ 1, i n / ∈ I ωn }. Define a strategy τ for player 2 as follows.
• Until stage ν, τ plays in blocks of size N (the last block may be shorter). In block l ≥ 0, where lN < ν, τ forgets past play and follows τ 1 (ω lN +1 ) for N stages.
• At stage ν, τ forgets past play and starts following τ 2 . Let σ be an arbitrary pure strategy. We will compute an upper bound on
Denote by g m1→m2 the average payoff from stage m 1 to stage m 2 . With θ * := N × ν N , since payoffs are nonnegative one has
On the event ν ≤ n − N , one has
where σ ν is the strategy induced by σ after ν. Since σ is pure, ν − 1 is a stopping time and, using (12),
On the other hand, on the event ν > n − N ,
We now proceed to the first term in the decomposition (11) of g n . For each l, we let π l = P ω,σ,τ (ν ≤ (l + 1)N | H lN +1 ). By the choice of N ,
on the event lN + 1 < ν. By taking expectations, this yields
By summation over l, and using the definition of θ * , this yields
The result follows by (11), (13) , (14) , and (15) .
We shall need a variant of the previous result whose proof is identical to the previous proof. Consider the stochastic game with incomplete information Γ(p, ω) where ω is a nonnull state and assume that transitions are controlled by player 2. Assume that player 1 can guarantee a function φ. Then player 1 can also guarantee min u,
Transitions controlled by player 1.
In this section we assume that transitions are controlled by player 1.
Existence of the value. Proposition 25. The unique fixed point of T 1 is the value of Γ.
Proof. Let φ be the unique fixed point of T 1 , and fix > 0 once and for all. We now prove that player 2 can guarantee φ.
Step 2. Definition of approachable sets. For ω ∈ Ω, let B ω be the set of vectors approachable in Γ V by player 2 at ω. We also define
By Proposition 14 and Lemma 22, A ω is the set of vectors approachable by player 2 at ω in the stochastic game with vector payoffs Γ V R . Both sets A ω and B ω are nonempty, closed, convex, and upwards comprehensive.
For every ω ∈ Ω define
Step 3.
Let τ 1 be a strategy that approaches a + ε at ω, and let τ 2 be a strategy that approaches b(ω ) + ε at each state ω . For each k the strategy τ 1 guarantees a k + ε in the game Γ(k, ω), and τ 2 has a similar property. By Lemma 24, applied independently to each G k , the strategy obtained by concatenation of τ 1 and τ 2 guarantees max a
Step 4. Player 2 can guarantee φ. Let f (p, ω) = inf a∈Bω a, p and h(p, ω) = inf a∈Dω a, p , so that by Step 3 f ≤ h. By Lemma 13 player 2 can guarantee a, p in Γ(p, ω) for every a ∈ B ω . Therefore he can guarantee f (p, ω) as well. By Lemma 11, the definition of D ω may be rephrased as
Thus, f ≤ T 1 f . By item 4 in Proposition 23, f ≤ φ. Therefore, player 2 can guarantee φ.
Optimal strategies.
The proof of Proposition 25 yields no information on ε-optimal strategies for player 1. We argue here that player 1 has an optimal strategy σ of a simple type. In effect, σ has the following structure. Whenever the play enters a communicating set, say at stage n ≥ 0, σ randomly selects a nonrevealing stationary strategy that is used until the play moves to a new communicating set, if ever. The random choice of the stationary strategy may itself be revealing, in that the distribution used at stage n to select a stationary strategy depends both on p n and on k. We describe below such a strategy in more detail.
Let v be the value of the game. Let (p, ω) ∈ ∆(K) × Ω be given. Upon entering a communicating set at stage n ≥ 0, player 1 computes v(p n ) = cav max{ u,
, and performs a state-dependent lottery, as described in the proof of Lemma 10. To be specific, one determines p e ∈ ∆(K), α e ∈ [0, 1], for e = 1, . . . , |K| + 1, such that e α e = 1, e α e p e = p n , and
If G k is the actual game that is played, player 1 chooses e according to a statedependent lottery µ k , where
, player 1 plays a stationary (nonrevealing) strategy which guarantees u(p e , ω n ) in the restricted game Γ R (p e , ω n ). Recall that there are finite-stage algorithms that compute this strategy. If, on the other hand, max u,
for some ω ∈ C ωn and i / ∈ I ω , player 1 plays the stationary strategy x Cω n until the play reaches ω , and at ω he plays the action i. He then recursively switches to a strategy that guarantees v(p e , ·). Under σ, player 1 will end up in finite time playing an optimal stationary strategy in some restricted game Γ R (p , ω ), with p ∈ ∆(K) and ω ∈ Ω. It can be checked that σ guarantees v(p, ω) − ε for every ε > 0. In that sense, σ is optimal. The proof is standard and therefore omitted.
An example.
We here provide a simple example that illustrates the basic issues of splitting and information revelation. In particular, in this example the informed player will perform two state-dependent lotteries and therefore reveal information in two different stages of the game, unlike what happens in standard repeated games with incomplete information. The game has three states Ω = {ω 1 , ω 2 , ω 3 }, where ω 2 and ω 3 are absorbing. There are two possible payoff functions, so that K = {1, 2}. A distribution over K is identified with the probability p ∈ [0, 1] assigned to k = 2.
We first describe the main features of the example before providing the payoff and transition matrices of the game.
All actions of player 1 at state ω 1 are stay actions, except one, which leads to either state ω 2 and ω 3 with equal probability.
The value u i (p) of the restricted gameΓ R (p, ω i ) is given by (see Figure 1 ) Note that 1/2(cav u 2 + cav u 3 ) is given by (see Figure 2 )
It is the payoff that is guaranteed by player 1, when starting at (p, ω 1 ), and exiting from ω 1 without revealing any information. Indeed, once in ω 2 or in ω 3 , the game will stay there and therefore the value is given by cav u 2 and cav u 3 , respectively. By section 4.2, the value v(p, ω 1 ) = cav max
is given by (see Figure 2 )
Assume that the game starts in state ω 1 , with p = 1/8. Note that v(1/8, ω 1 ) = The optimal strategy described in section 4.2.2 is as follows. Player 1 starts by tossing a state-dependent coin. If the coin comes up heads, player 1 plays forever an optimal stationary strategy in the game k = 1. If the coin comes up tails, player 1 first plays the nonstay action. The game then moves with equal probability to states ω 2 and ω 3 . In the former case, player 1 continues with an optimal nonrevealing stationary strategy in the average gameΓ R (1/4, ω 2 ). In the latter case, player 2 again tosses a (degenerate) state-dependent coin. If k = 1 (resp., k = 2), player 1 continues with an optimal strategy in the gameΓ R (0, ω 3 ) (resp.,Γ R (1, ω 3 ) ).
Note that the amount of information revealed by player 1 depends on the actual play.
To complete the example, we provide in Figure 3 payoff matrices that satisfy the required specifications. The vertical arrows that appear in the bottom row of the two top matrices stand for the random transition to either ω 2 or ω 3 .
In both states ω 1 and ω 2 , player 2 is a dummy. The incomplete information game that corresponds to the game of state ω 3 coincides with example 1.3 in Zamir [24] .
Transitions controlled by player 2.
In this section we assume that transitions are controlled by player 2. We prove that both the min-max value and the max-min value exist, but that they may differ. Proof. Let φ be the unique fixed point of T 2 , and fix ε > 0.
Step 1 Step 2. Definition of a reply. Given (p, ω), we let τ 1 (p, ω) be a (stationary) strategy that guarantees u(p, ω)+ε in Γ R (p, ω). Choose N 1 ∈ N such that γ n (p, ω, σ, τ 1 (p, ω) ) ≤ u(p, ω) + 2ε for every n ≥ N 1 and every nonrevealing strategy σ of player 1.
By the remark that follows Definition 1, N 1 can be chosen independently of (p, ω). Let T be the set of strategies of player 2 in Γ R (p, ω), and let τ ∈ T be an ε 2 /32N 2 1 -exhausting information strategy given σ and (p, ω). Choose N ∈ N such that
We define τ as follows.
• Play τ up to stage N .
• At stage N compute Step 3. The computation. We here prove that τ defends φ
We abbreviate E p,ω,σ,τ to E. First, we provide an upper bound on the average payoff E g N →N +n−1 |H N between stages N and N + n on the event
By the choice of N 1 ,
On the other hand, by Lemma 17,
Thus, using (18) ,
The same computation applies to any block of N 1 stages. Specifically, for each b ≥ 0,
Since u(p, ·) is constant on every communicating set, and since
By taking expectations on the event A (defined by (17) ), one gets, by Lemma 16, (16) , and since · 1 ≤ · 2 ,
By averaging over blocks, one obtains for every n ≥
On the other hand, there is N 2 ∈ N such that for every n ≥ N 2 ,
By taking expectations, (19) and (20) yield
Let v denote the max-min of the game, and let (p, ω) be given. Similar to the discussion in section 4.2.2, it can be checked that there is a simple strategy for player 1 that guarantees v(p, ω) − ε for each ε > 0. Under this strategy, player 1 chooses at random a nonrevealing stationary strategy whenever the play enters a communicating set, and uses it until the play moves to a new communicating set.
The min-max value.
Lemma 27. The unique fixed point of T 3 is the min-max value of Γ. Proof. Let φ be the unique fixed point of T 3 , and fix ε > 0. We first prove by induction that player 2 can guarantee φ. Set φ ∈ J ωn }. The supremum of P p,ω,σ,τ (ν < ∞) over all strategies σ coincides with the supremum over all nonrevealing strategies σ. 6 Denote by σ * a nonrevealing strategy that achieves the supremum up to ε. We choose N such that P p,ω,σ * ,τ (ν > N) ≤ ε. The strategy σ * thus exhausts the probability of leaving the initial communicating set. Denote by τ min{ν,N } the strategy induced by τ after stage min{ν, N }.
On the event ν > N, there is a strategy
This strategy depends on the history up to stage N .
We now define the reply σ of player 1 to τ as follows: play σ * up to stage min{ν, N }.
• • If ν ≤ N , switch to a strategy that defends φ 0 m (p, ω ν ) + ε against τ ν . Since there are finitely many histories of length N , the set of strategies (τ min{ν,N } ) is finite. It is straightforward to check that σ defends min cav u, min
against τ .
An example.
Here we provide an example where min{cav f, g} is strictly larger than cav min{f, g}, so that the max-min value and the min-max value differ.
Consider the game depicted in Figure 4 , where player 2 controls the transitions, and |Ω| = |K| = 2, |I| = 2, and |J| = 5. The initial state is ω 1 (bottom two matrices). If in ω 1 player 2 chooses j 5 , the game moves to ω 2 , which is absorbing. If player 2 chooses another action in ω 1 , the game remains in ω 1 . Payoffs are as depicted in Figure 4 (the definition of g
The game Γ R (p, ω 1 ) is similar to Example 3.3 in Aumann and Maschler [2] . As calculated in Aumann and Maschler,
(see Figure 5 ). Note that cav f = f . The game Γ R (p, ω 2 ) is similar to the game presented in Aumann and Maschler [2, I.2], with all payoffs multiplied by 4.
7 As calculated in Aumann and Maschler,
As proved above, the max-min value when the initial state is ω 1 is (cav min{f, g}) (p), while the min-max value is min{cav f, g}(p). A straightforward calculation shows that min{cav f, g}(1/2) = 3(2 − √ 3) while cav min{f, g}(1/2) = 4/5, so the two functions differ. The graphs of the two functions appear in Figure 6 . 7 We added the actions j 3 , j 4 , j 5 , which do not change the calculation of the value. For our purposes, we could have multiplied all payoffs by any α, 3 < α < 3/( √ 3 − 1). 5. Incomplete information on both sides.
The model.
We now extend our model to the case of incomplete information on both sides; that is, each player has some private information on the game that is to be played. Formally the model is extended as follows. For more details we refer to Mertens, Sorin, and Zamir [10] or Sorin [22] .
A two-player zero-sum stochastic game with incomplete information on both sides is described by a finite collection (G k,l ) k∈K,l∈L of stochastic games, together with a distribution p ∈ ∆(K) and a distribution s ∈ ∆(L). We assume that the games G k,l differ only through their reward functions g k,l , but they all have the same sets of states Ω and actions I and J, and the same transition rule q.
The game is played in stages. At the outset of the game a pair (k, l) ∈ K × L is chosen according to p ⊗ s. Player 1 is informed of k, and player 2 of l. At every stage n, the two players choose simultaneously actions i n ∈ I and j n ∈ J, and ω n+1 is drawn according to q(· | ω n , i n , j n ). Both players are informed of (i n , j n , ω n+1 ). W.l.o.g. we assume throughout this section that transitions are controlled by player 1. We will only sketch the proofs, since none of them involves any new idea.
Related literature.
The main results in this framework are related to the case |Ω| = 1 (repeated games with incomplete information) and are due to Aumann, Maschler, and Stearns [3] (see also Aumann and Maschler [2] ) and Mertens and Zamir [11, 12] . As in the case of incomplete information on one side, we denote by u(p, s) the value of the matrix game with action sets I and J and matrix payoff (p, s, ω) ) in which player 1 (resp., player 2) is informed of k (resp., l) while his opponent gets no information. Our first goal is to extend Proposition 21.
Proposition 28. For every u(p, s, ω) .
Proof. The proof follows the proof for repeated games with incomplete information, using the tools developed in the previous sections. We shall only sketch the arguments for the min-max value, and refer for details to Zamir [24] .
First, we explain how player 2 can guarantee vex s cav p u(p, s, ω). When player 2 ignores his information, he faces a game with incomplete information on one side with parameter set K and payoffs l∈L s l g k,l . By Proposition 21, player 2 can guarantee cav p u(p, s, ω) in this game. Therefore by Lemma 10 (with the roles of the two players exchanged) he can also guarantee vex s cav p u(p, s, ω).
To prove that player 1 can defend vex s cav p u(p, s, ω), we adapt Zamir [24, Theorem 4.1]. Let τ be a given strategy of player 2. As in Step 2 of the proof of Lemma 26, we let player 1 play first an ε-exhausting strategy σ given τ . This strategy may be chosen to be nonrevealing (see, e.g., Sorin [ (21) and (22) , and both T 4 and T 5 reduce to T 1 . If player 1 has no information, there is no cav operator in (21) and (22), and T 4 and T 5 reduce respectively to T 3 and T 2 with the roles of the players reversed.
Proof. The first assertion follows the same lines as the proof of Proposition 23. We now prove the second assertion. For j = 0, 1, we define the sequence (φ To prove that player 2 can defend v, we combine several ideas from the preceding sections. Let σ be given, and let T be the set of nonrevealing strategies of player 2. We let τ σ be a nonrevealing strategy that ε-exhausts the information contained in σ, and choose N as in Step 2 of Lemma 26. Denote by ν = 1 + min{n ≥ 1, i n / ∈ I ωn }. Player 2 plays according to τ σ up to stage min{ν, N }.
• If ν ≤ N , from stage ν on he defends φ (p, s N , ω N ) , as in the proof of Proposition 25. The result follows.
